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As soon as an article goes into mass production the company doesn't want to know about a simpler better article,
especially if it is basically different. So a number of very good inventions are scrapped and forgotten. We can extrapolate
that the same formula applies to living organisms once we have accepted the supposition that living organisms are
artifacts created for a definite purpose. 1
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly or
as incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object for which it was
created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individuality; properties by
which a perpetual succession of many persons are considered as the same, and act as a single individual. They enable
a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless
necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose
of clothing bodies of men in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and are
in use. By these means, a perpetual succession of individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of the particular





The concept of distributive share is an ancient one
which can be traced back in Western thought to the pre-
Socratics and before By distributive share I mean, here at
the outset, the concept of a social portion due each member
of society as their fair and rightful allotment of economic
value. Whether the basis of a distributive share is labor per-
formed, social status or some formalized property right em-
bodied in land or shares of stock, these often opposing
forms of the concept will form the historical backdrop of
this essay. This essay is, however, an attempt to examine
some of the ideological and more recent practical
developments of the concept in respect to its use in dif-
ferent forms of worker ownership schemes that are currently
assuming a more important role in industrial organization
in Europe and the United States. One of the central
background questions for this discussion is whether and
to what extent these ownership schemes are transitional
property forms in a movement away from capitalist pro-
perty relations, or whether they constitute just another
adaptation of capitalism. The role of the idea of distributive
share in the history of American ideology will be touched
on briefly, as well as more recent discussions of the func-
tion of the corporation and the relation of management and
shareholders. Lastly, I will examine some of the ideological
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implications of the recent Massachusetts and New York
cooperatives statutes. At a more practical economic level
the central guiding question will be: why have enterprises
which feature worker ownership in the form of employee
stock ownership tended to revert to traditional capitalist
ownership where no significant restrictions exist on sale
of shares on the market?
The Distributive Share and the Social Minimum
It will be useful to discuss the role of the distributive
share in Rawls' Theory of Justice before turning to more
strictly legal and economic concerns. One reason to do so
is the fact that the distributive share is treated in an entire
section of Rawls' work. Another reason is that the concept
of distributive share is historically inseparable from the
discussion of what justice is. This is true especially in the
modem era. Thus, it will be worthwhile to examine how
Rawls uses the term and in what setting it is given
significance
At the heart of the Rawlsian view of the distributive
share is the concept of social minimum which takes the
form of minimal entitlement (a negative income tax) or a
fair wage principle. Attached to the notion of negative in-
come tax is, of course, the distributional assumption of a
graded tax system.3 Holding to one side the basic principles
of socialist economics, Rawls assumes that his two precepts
of justice can be fulfilled in a capitalist market economy
by means of a fair price system and a tax system incor-
porating the negative income tax.4 Informing his entire view,
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then, is the image of a distributional scheme wholly set
apart from the productive/proprietary sector of the
economy. The questions of ownership and property forms,
whether public or private, appear as matters of indifference
in his analysis. The distributive share is something passively
received by the waiting millions in this welfare-model of
justice which apotheosizes the liberalism of the 1960s.
Given the rudiments of a fair pricing system within the
market a fair wage will somehow inevitably follow just as
the effects of unemployment or underemployment will be
mollified by the use of an income supplement. It is one proof
of the stunting effect of Reaganism that Rawls' suggestion
of a negative income tax now seems almost visionary.
However, it must be remembered that the current conser-
vative resurgence is due to the failure of liberalism as a
policy and an ideology. The passive image underlying Rawls'
concept of distributive share in no way addresses the prob-
lems of the era of inflation, deindustrialization, and in-
creased domination of the large corporations in the form
of conglomerates and multi-nationals.
Though Rawls' work serves as a useful historical in-
dication of the more recent development of the idea of
distributive share, embodying its characteristic weakness,
Marx is actually more helpful in clarifying the problems
which inhere in the notion of a distributive share. In Capital,
Marx, for a moment, presents us with a picture of his con-
ception of economic reality outside the critical descriptive
presentation of capitalism.
Let us now picture to ourselves, by way of
change, a community of free individuals, carry-
ing on their work with the means of production
in common, in which the labor-power of all the
different individuals is consciously applied as
the combined labor-power of the community.
All the characteristics of Robinson's labor are
here repeated, but with this difference, that they
are social, instead of individual. Everything pro-
duced by him was exclusively the result of his
own personal labor, and therefore simply an ob-
ject of use for himself. The total product of our
community is a social product. One portion
serves as fresh means of production and re-
mains social. But another portion is consumed
by the members as means of subsistence. A
distribution of this portion amongst them is
consequently necessary. The mode of this dis-
tribution will vary with the productive organiza-
tion of the community, and the degree.of his-
torical development attained by the producers.
We will assume, but merely for the sake of a
parallel with the production of commodities,
that the share of each individual producer in the
means of subsistence is determined by his
labor-time Labor-time would, in that case, play
a double part. Its apportionment in accordance
with a definite social plan maintains the pro-
per proportion between the different kinds of
work to be done and the various wants of the
community. On the other hand, it also serves
as a measure of the portion of the common
labor borne by each individual, and of his share
in the part of the total product destined for in-
dividual consumption. The social relations of
the individual producers, with regard both to
their labor and its products, are in this case
perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with
regard not only to production but also to
distribution.5
At first glance Marx's formulation may appear very
similar to that of Rawls. The reader sees a division between
a productive area and a distributive area. However, unlike
Rawls, Marx assumes a total social product that is then
divided not by the operations of the market as Rawls
assumes (whether regulated or not is irrelevant), but by a
rational planning process representing the "community of
free individuals" who hold and control the means of pro-
duction in common. Marx is attempting throughout his
work to imagine that general middle term which as a
democratic decision-making structure will link the separate
moments of economic activity, here portrayed as produc-
tion and distribution. Instead of the alienated relation of
things (commodities) in the market, he looks for "the social
relations of the individual producers
Under this reformulation of economic life the notion
of distributive share is transformed. Indeed, from the stand-
point of American ideology and its notion of distributive
share (as seen in Rawls), this reformulation seems to
dispense with the idea of distributive share The conflict
in Marx and Rawls is not only between that which is held
(owned) and that which is consumed, but between different
notions of ownership. As this essay develops, these con-
flicts will be further discussed as background to the
ideological assumptions behind worker ownership schemes
which feature marketed shares and cooperatives which do
not.
Before turning to the recent cooperatives statutes,
however, two views of distributive shares will be examined.
First, the Jeffersonian ideal of the small agrarian freehold,
and second, the idea of the share in the corporation.
The Jeffersonian Idea of Distributive Share
Thd distributive share is most prominently present in
early American political thought in the form of the allot-
ment of land. In Jefferson's Proposed Constitution for
Virginia of June 1776, the principle of allotment is clearly
enunciated in the fourth article:
Every person of full age neither owning nor




tied to an appropriation of 50 acres or to so
much as shall make up what he owns or has
owned 50 acres in full and absolute dominion.
6
That land was regarded almost religiously as the source
of wealth in the eighteenth century is by now a recognized
commonplace The Physiocrats (Turgot, Buffon and others),
however, had attempted to raise to scientific exactitude the
economic production of French agriculture and Jefferson
was later to take their teachings as a further confirmation
of his agrarian schemes. The point of this agrarian
distributive formula is to create a political majority of "in-
dependent" producers in which the owner is the laborer.
The distributive share is literally a physical portion of the
wealth-producing substance. Yet this supposedly real por-
tion is curiously enough the greatest and most deceptive
of fictions. The share (the right of title in the limited amount
of land), while ideally an "absolute dominion is in truth the
perfect tidbit for market expropriation by banks and other
creditors.
An example, even more, a model, of the sublime
vulnerability of Jeffersonian land distribution schemes is
recounted in James Willard Hurst's monumental Law and
Economic Growth. Describing the exploitation of Wiscon-
sin's forests through the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, Hurst details early Wisconsin property law. Of special
relevance is his account of the land appropriation limits im-
posed on the first settlement of the state and how these
limits were routinely evaded without subsequent
enforcement 7
The political and economic ideal of the farmer-laborer
featured at its heart the proposition that wage labor and
its attendant evils could be held to a minimum and the do-
main of the market restricted because the farmer and his
family in a well-run farm was the perfectly contained
production-consumption unit. Most of what was needed
could simply be produced on the farm. This fiction, of
course, neglects the historical fact of the need for hired labor
running from the hired hand to migrant labor. A species
of the landless was essential as an ideologically invisible
underpinning.8 Moreover, in earlier times, the slave and the
indentured servant provided basic labor, not just support,
to the farmer.
Though ostensibly a distributive mechanism which Is
intended to work against concentrations of property and
wealth, the Jeffersonian ideal of distributive share in fact
sets no upper limit on continuing ownership. The "social
relations of the individual producers" referred to by Marx,
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which are at the same time economic relations, are left to
the accident of economic forces, most prominently the sale
of agricultural commodities as well as the means of pro-
duction itself, land. Under the compulsion of these market
forces the idea of a distributive share as a portion of pro-
ductive land is more realistically a scheme to divide the
agricultural base of production as a mere prelude to con-
centration and the survival of large holdings owned by
absentee landlords. Far from being the guarantor of stable
and equitable ownership by the largest number, the Jeffer-
sonian distributive share invests its believer with an un-
founded picture of individualism based on a fiction of
absolute possession, only to place the small freeholder on
the verge of dispossession.
The purpose of this brief analysis has been to lay the
groundwork for a proposition: The distributive share is itself
a commodity and as such has significance only within a
larger structure of alienation. Having no ideological or prac-
tical connection to a larger unalienated whole, the
distributive share is entirely defined by the moment of sale.
Even Rawls' social minimum as a distributive share is de-
fined by commodity sale. Either a "fair price' is gotten for
the sale of labor or the entitlement of a negative income
tax goes into effect. The truth of viewing the distributive
share in this way is perhaps best seen in the standard
ownership form of the corporation.
The Aggregation of Shares: The Corporation
The modem corporation is a whole whose life tends
to exceed that of the sum of its parts. This inertial tenden-
cy of "immortality" was recognized in American law as the
advantage of the corporation in contradistinction to the
small freehold. John Marshall in Trustees of Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward acknowledges this fact in the words of
his opinion which attach the Aristotelean attributes of
godhood to the corporation.9 The corporation has a life of
its own apart from its stockholders. This is, of course, the
familiar Berle-Means view of the corporation' However,
what I am interested in here is the ideological significance
of the fact that the corporation is at once an actual
economic enterprise producing commodities for the market,
as well as a partial commodity in itself. The alienated rela-
tion between management, employees, and stockholders
is seen in the conflict which inevitably arises out of a divi-
sion of function among those who run the enterprise, those
who are supposed to passively produce for it, and those
absentee owners whose interest lies solely in stockholdings.
The distributive share seen as the share of stock is in-
tended not so much as the basis for ownership of the enter-
prise, as to attract outsiders, who, in exchange for invest-
ment acquire a limited owner interest in the corporation.
In the corporate model, the absentee or alienated owner-
ship interest is seen as a partial good, or at least a neces-
sity, insofar as the corporation is defined as a capital-
seeking entity which acquires its investment base by means
of the operations of the stock market. The producers, con-
trollers, and investors appear as three antithetical forces
within this standard scheme of corporate structure. The fact
that management or, as we shall see, workers own stock
in the corporation does not necessarily lessen these
conflicts.
The share of stock which denotes an ownership in-
terest in the corporation has a peculiar characteristic. It is
wholly defined in its essential features by the moment of
sale. Even dividends derived from possessing it are traceable
to its varying price. Like the acre of land, the share of stock
as a distributive share has greatest significance when it is
being sold. It is held for the purpose of sale, the anticipated
moment when its true value will be realized. If the moment
of sale is generalized so that all stockholders sell, a kind
of dissolution occurs. Those stockholders are entirely
replaced by another set. The corporation, however, would
not be likely to survive such a drastic turnover.
The alienated character of the share of stock is often
not recognized by workers or their unions when buy-outs
of companies in the form of wholesale stock purchases are
being considered. Perhaps the most striking example of the
instability of employee stock ownership schemes is the re-
cent purchase of Weirton Steel by its employees." Though
ostensibly an instance of "employee ownership," a number
of highly restrictive measures have been imposed on the
worker-stockholders. They do not effectively pick manage-
ment. The enterprise is heavily in debt to banks. The work-
ers have waived millions of dollars of close-down benefits
owed to them by National Steel, the former owner of Weir-
ton Steel. And most decisively from the standpoint of this
essay, after six years stock in Weirton Steel will be sold
on the market. In other words, worker ownership will be
diluted by outside investors. Thus, the process of reversion
to the previous structure of ownership has been inserted
into the buy-out arrangement from the very beginning.
Other types of reversions to standard capitalist owner-
ship schemes have occurred in the plywood cooperatives
of the Northwest where successful cooperatives such as
Olympia Veneer were sold to larger non-cooperative firms.'
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Worker-owned plants such as Vermont Asbestos provide
another example of sale to businessmen after relatively few
years of operation.' 3 The overall points of difficulty where
reversion has occurred seem to be two. first, outside invest-
ment funding is scarce and unreliable, and second, the
model of worker-ownership based on the sellable
distributive share (in the form of stock) is ideologically and
economically suited for reversion.
The Cooperative Form of Ownership
The cooperative, despite its many forms, is essential-
ly an attempt to overcome the alienation structure which
animates the internal life of an economic enterprise under
the normal conditions of modem capitalism. Whether a
cooperative also poses a challenge to the external com-
petitive relations of capitalists, i.e. the pressures of the
SpRvG '86
market between enterprises, is another question.
Certainly in the case of the Mondragon cooperatives
of the Basque region of northern Spain, a cooperative view
of society as a whole has led to a set of interrelated enter-
prises ranging from appliance factories to scientific research
institutes. The idea behind Mondragon is one that looks
to a society in which the distinction between producers and
owners are eliminated along with the class antagonisms
attendant on the distinction.
The question I wish to raise here in keeping with dif-
ferent views of the problem of the distributive share, is: how
does the notion of the distributive share differ in a
Mondragon-style cooperative from that in the stock com-
pany? The response to this question provides a view as
to why reversion occurs in many employee stock owner-
ship situations. It will also shed light on how a certain
specific view of the distributive share has become, in the
United States, the paragon of equitable ownership which
has exerted a dominant and noxious ideological influence
to the exclusion of more just and sophisticated views of
the distributive share
A series of more theoretical questions, as a background
to further discussion may be helpful here Can a kind of
share be developed which is not essentially a consumption
share (like the share of stock), but which brings with it an
active participatory element? Is such a form of ownership
compatible with the standard capitalist form of property?
The Mondragon cooperatives have attempted, not with
automatic success, to introduce worker control mechanisms
along with new types of ownership rights. In addition, they
have very successfully addressed the problem of the ag-
gregation of stable investment funds by setting up a
cooperative banking system. The consequences of this
development cannot be overestimated for the long term
development of other cooperatives in what is still an essen-
tially capitalist economy. No cooperatives in the United
States, the plywood cooperatives for example, have similar-
ly confronted the problem of mutual aid and economic in-
terrelation as a way of ensuring stability in an economical-
ly hostile environment. The Caja Laboral Popular, Mon-
dragon's cooperative bank, is a remarkable and necessary
step toward a community of stable producer cooperatives! 4
The other important innovation of Mondragon is the
introduction of internal capital accounts and one producer/
one vote governing schemes. The internal capital account
displaces the need for a stock ownership formula. A Mon-
dragon cooperative cannot be dissolved into a collection
of shares marketed at a specific price The capital account
of each worker is also always largely invested in the enter-
prise As Johnson and Whyte noted in their study of Mon-
dragon, "since 70% of the profits are distributed to the
members only by being credited to their accounts, the firm
has 85 to 90% of profits to reinvest, instead of 15 to 20%
(the reserve fund):' S The internal capital account works as
a running wage fund and a retirement fund for each
member.
The ideological importance of the difference between
employee-owned shares of stock and cooperative member-
ship rights is the basis of the difference between an enter-
prise which can revert to capitalist absentee ownership and
one that has a greater chance of remaining worker-
controlled. The assumption made throughout this essay is
that a social structure is as much a form of consciousness
as it is a practical material entity. The Mondragon
cooperatives are themselves products of a confrontation
between ideal and practical constructs. Thus, to understand
these cooperatives it is essential to inquire into the con-
sciousness people have of the structures that they propose.
Here, the guiding concept has been that of the distributive
share and the various guises it assumes in different social
settings. These guises, I have tried to show, are not just
different, but often in opposition.
Where the distributive share presents itself as a
separate consumption share, as was seen in the small
freehold and even more in the share of stock, the ideological
assumption, the rhetorical posture, was one that seemed
to emphasize individual ownership. Yet another reality, often
not ideologically recognized from within the particular con-
ception, was also shown to exist. Where a certain naive
belief in a form of ownership was dominant, a correspond-
ing pattern of dispossession also occurred that could not
be explained from within the ideological assumption of
ownership, for example, the distributive share as a portion
of land.
David Ellerman and Peter Pitegoff have offered prac-
tical proposals for cooperative statutes that were later
adopted by Massachusetts 16 and New York.17 What I am
interested in here is the ideological conception they have
offered in support of the statutes, as well as their use of
the notion of distributive share
Membership Rights or Personal Rights
The essential strength of Ellerman and Pitegoffs posi-
tion is that they recognize that Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans (ESOPs) and other worker ownership situations
where ownership takes the form of discreet sellable shares
tend to revert to the previous form of ownership. 8 This
recognition has led them to propose a cooperative struc-
ture that is very similar to the Mondragon model, with the
exception that the important investment structure which
would resemble Mondragons cooperative bank is left out.
The reasons for this important difference would themselves
make an interesting study, but suffice it to say that
American law does not allow credit union arrangements
the investment leeway that it does traditional banks.
The other element of Mondragon, however, they have
incorporated into their cooperative proposals. The internal
capital account is an option under the two statutes adopted.
The composite term for this component they call member-
ship rights, a combination of voting rights (one member/one
vote) and net income rights. They go out of their way to
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explain that "membership rights are not property rights." 9
This significant formulation indicates that their view
of the cooperative proposals sets them at odds with those
proponents of worker ownership in the form of distributive
shares as consumption-alienation shares. Instead, cogni-
zant of the social ideology behind Mondragon, Ellerman
and Pitegoff have constructed proposals much closer to
Marx than to Jefferson in their conception of distributive
justice and the portion of the social product due each
member of the collectively held enterprise This social por-
tion due the member is not, however, a detachable entity
that can be dissolved into a value outside except in the form
of money returned from the internal capital account.
The concept of membership right has behind it a dif-
ferent idea of the relation of the parts (members) to the
whole (the collective enterprise). The portion or distributive
share belonging to each member arises from his/her active
participation in the cooperative. The membership right is
just that right to participation. Because it is not a property
right, unlike that of the ideal Jeffersonian farmer, it does
not admit to being disposed of or sold in any absolute
sense.
The internal capital account represents what is owed
to the individual member, but does not stand for a portion
of the enterprise itself which can be tom off and alienated
to another individual. The new member simply takes up
the position of the member who has left or retired- Even
the entrance fee does not purchase a share of stock, it
simply guarantees a contribution to the investment fund
(the collective fund and the new member's internal account).
The membership rights exist as long as the activity of
membership lasts.
Why then do Ellerman and Pitegoff feel it necessary
to resort to the notion of personal rights and, at the end,
to the very fictional (and contradictory) theory of natural
rights from the eighteenth century to justify and clarify their
position on cooperatives? Is not the concept of a member-
ship right directly antithetical to and contradictory with a
personal right? Does not the same contradiction exist
between a membership right and a natural right? Ellerman
and Pitegoff summarize their efforts this way:
Our topic has been the structuring of economic
organizations and institutions so that in-
dividuals shall "carry about7 with themselves
two basic rights which, in the parlance of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are
natural rights: the right of democratic self-
government and the right to the fruits of ones
labor. People will carry about these two rights
if organizations are structured so that (1) the
right to govern is assigned to the functional role
of being governed, and (2) the rights to the fruits
of production are assigned to the functional role
of producing those products.
20
The two authors then refer to their attempt to see these
rights both in terms of the cooperatives of Mondragon and
their proposed cooperative statute as 'institutions embody-
ing these rights."
The first objection to these formulations and their
philosophical muddle-headedness is that theories of natural
right assume a human being who somehow has these rights
prior to the existence of human society, and thus, prior to
the existence of institutions. A membership right as such
is completely consistent with the mutual recognition of in-
dividuals' rights by one another in the context of a com-
munity, i.e. an institution. There is then no need whatsoever
to refer to natural rights as magically inhering in individuals.
The idea of a structure of mutual and reciprocal recogni-
tion as the basis of rights among individuals seems a more
cogent explanation. I offer the suggestion that Ellerman and
Pitegoff by their reference to natural rights theory (and the
equation of membership right with personal right) have
preserved, perhaps unwittingly or for rhetorical reasons, the
older idea of distributive share that was also an essential
part of seventeenth and eighteenth century political theory.
A personal right as a natural right assumes that the
right inheres in the individual and can be carried about by
him or her, independent of a social or historical setting. This
is, of course, the basis of modem Western individualism
and the concept of distributive share as private ownership.
The argument here is not so much with the actual
cooperative structure set up the statutes as with Ellerman
and Pitegoffs explanation of the basis of the structure they
endorse. Why would they bother to invoke the concept of
personal right when that concept is the basis of the con-
servative argument that personal rights to one's own labor
and how it is disposed (including by transference and in-
heritance) are best guaranteed when there is no institutional
constraint whatsoever? This is certainly Robert Nozick's
argument and its corollary of minimal institutions.2
Ellerman and Pitegoff do not change the meaning of
personal right, though that may have been their intention.
Instead, they undermine the significant ideal of social cohe-
sion, and justice within that cohesion, that is an essential
part of the ideology of the Mondragon cooperatives. This
might be an attempt to Americanize the ideology of
cooperatives, but the contradictions they open themselves
up to can only be utilized by those who oppose them in
an attempt to preserve corporate capitalism.
The membership right should supplant the notion of
personal right and natural right. The concept of member-
ship right is simpler and explains the internal capital ac-
count In addition, the membership right goes deeper. It con-
ceptualizes the fact that human beings gain social recogni-
tion and achieve elementary economic life in a setting with
others. Insofar as they are members of a community or in-
stitution they gain individual economic benefits. These
benefits and rights are not somehow there prior to enter-
ing into relations with others. True rights are something
human beings accord each other equally. They are not drop-
ped on each individual from above. Yet, in each of these
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pictures of the origin of rights there is an assumption about
the distributive share. In the one, the share is something
the individual holds. In the other, it is something each in-
dividual shares. As such, it is only a part that has
significance in the context of a whole
This brings me to a final consideration of the concept
of the distributive share as found in current worker owner-
ship schemes. The supposed guarantee to the producers
of the control of the social product in the cooperative form
leaves open the question of the larger social and economic
organization between cooperatives.
The existence of a cooperative here or there, even as
possible under the recent Massachusetts and New York
cooperatives statutes, does not change the character of cor-
porate domination of American society. These coopera-
tives, like ESOPs, can be viewed from the outside as
enclaves where some of the ordinary exploitations of
capitalism do not exist in the harsher forms. However, the
cooperative faces other enterprises, including other
cooperatives, in a situation of cut-throat competition
governed by the market. One assumes that the pressures
of the market will simply make isolated, short-lived,
cooperative curiosities as has been the case with the older
plywood cooperatives.
The Mondragon cooperatives, because based on the
ideal of a cooperative society as such and the membership
rights accruing therein, have addressed this question at least
implicitly. This is not to say that problems have not arisen
in Mondragon or that utopia has been achieved in these
cooperatives. But one senses a greater ideological
sophistication which includes the realization that a single
isolated cooperative is a contradiction in terms. A societal
change is needed. In contrast, American attempts to con-
front the question of worker ownership of the workplace
seem restrictively tied to previous models of bourgeois
ownership and the ideological attachments following from
these models. Is it any wonder, then, that worker owner-
ship schemes based if only in part on these models and
their ideological concepts, have a tendency to revert to the
kinds of ownership most characteristic of their models.
The conclusion is inevitable that the concept of
distributive share, as developed in American ideology, is
too unstable a concept on which to base worker owner-
ship schemes. As a model of fairness, the distributive share
bespeaks a fragmentation and atomization which is perfect
for capitalist economies. When it informs the actual
organization of worker ownership schemes reversion is
common.
In contrast, the notion of membership rights, shom of
natural rights theory, provides a newer and more useful way
of seeing the rights of workers in cooperatives. An idea in
its historical force can both form and limit practical
possibilities. In its idea of distributive share, the ideology
of natural rights has written mechanisms of economic con-
trol into its very concept of justice.
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